Italian Fascism and the Lateran Treaty

Between 1924 and 1929, Mussolini's Fascist Party managed to gain the support of conservative and Catholic Italians who previously had withheld their support. The Lateran Treaty of 1929 was an attempt to end a conflict between the Italian state and the Roman Catholic Church that had existed since 1870-1871. Between 1870 and 1929, the popes were "prisoners of the Vatican," and were opponents of the "liberal" Italian state. Most Italian politicians were openly anticlerical and sought to limit Catholic control of education and marriage. Mussolini was extremely anticlerical, both as a Socialist and later as a Fascist. His fascist formula was simple: "Nothing above the state, nothing outside the state, everything and everyone to serve the state."

Since Mussolini knew that he dare not attack the Catholic Church or its peasant supporters, he posed as the "protector" of Italian Catholics. He opened negotiations with the papacy in 1926 to heal the rift between the Church and the "usurping power," as Church officials referred to the Italian state. The negotiations were not easy, but Mussolini soon showed that he had the upper hand when he outlawed the Catholic youth organization Exploratori Cattolici. The Church hierarchy was divided among "social Catholics" who opposed fascism, and conservatives and pragmatists who accepted Mussolini's rule as desirable. Most Italian Catholics were not antifascist, for nationalism pulled them toward fascism. Many saw the issue as one between greater and lesser evils. Mussolini was preferable to anarchy or Marxism.

Pope Pius XI (in white) with serving priests of the Vatican

Achille Ratti, Cardinal Archbishop of Milan, became Pope Pius XI in 1922. He had witnessed communist and anarcho-syndicalist struggles in the Milanese industrial area earlier. He also had witnessed the rise of fascism, as Milan was a leading center of fascist activity. Milanese fascists had served as strikebreakers, beaten up political opponents, and engaged in street fights with communists. Even so, Pius XI apparently was convinced that fascism was a less destructive force than communism, and that Mussolini would be a responsible leader.

The Lateran Treaty was signed on February 11, 1929. The agreement had three separate parts: a treaty, a concordat, and a financial agreement. The treaty granted sovereignty over the Vatican City in a small papal enclave in Rome to the pope. In return, the Church dropped its claims to Rome and the old Papal States. The concordat was a separate agreement between the Italian state (represented by Mussolini) and the Church. The state accepted Catholic education and brought its laws into conformity with Catholic teachings on marriage and divorce. The property of the Church was to be protected. Lastly, a financial agreement pledged the Italian state to support the Church. What did Mussolini and the fascists gain from such concessions to the Church? The Lateran Treaty gave the fascists legitimacy. It allowed Catholics to support fascism in good conscience, and it neutralized the Church's criticism of fascism. Only a few communists and liberal or socialist intellectuals opposed fascism before 1940 or so.

Adolf Hitler and National Socialism

Adolf Hitler (1883-1945) accepted Mussolini's Italian fascism as a model for his own National Socialist (Nazi for short) movement. There are obvious similarities between the two movements. Both movements were totalitarian movements as opposed to authoritarian ones. Both depended on the unsettled social and economic conditions after World War I for their growth. Both were dominated by a single "Leader" (Duce in Italian; Führer in German). Above all, both movements moved from radical anti-government movements to respectable political movements within the system. This shift was all-important to the success of the fascist movements in Germany and Italy. Instead of remaining fringe movements made up of eccentrics, revolutionaries, and street brawlers, these fascist movements became respectable after a time. This change allowed the movements to attract the support of younger, educated members of the bourgeoisie. These bourgeois men and women were socially and educationally far superior to the original adherents of fascism.

The fascist movements were no less dynamic and revolutionary for having entered the social mainstream. In fact, their new inclusiveness made fascism much stronger, for older and more conservative right-wing movements lost younger bourgeois members to them. Over time, traumatized members of the lower-middle and middle classes in Germany and Italy came to view fascism as a viable political alternative. Once their movements ceased to represent revolutionary outsiders, the fascists greatly broadened their support base.

Hitler and the Lessons of the Beer Hall Putsch

Hitler (arrowed to) after the Beer Hall Putsch in 1923

Hitler learned from direct political experience that an outsider could not create a violent revolution. His 1923 Munich uprising—called the Beer Hall Putsch (revolt)—was a serious political miscalculation. The uprising grew out of the power struggle between the Nazis and Bavarian monarchists who wanted to secede from Germany.

In 1923, both National Socialism and Bavarian separatism were obscure lost causes. To survive, their leaders had to meet the following four challenges:

Paul von Hindenburg (1847-1934), a Bismarckian conservative, was the last president of the Weimar Republic. He had represented the Quartet all his life. As field marshal, Hindenburg's concept of strategic surrender had preserved the Quartet at the end of World War I and forced the majority socialists to deal with it after 1918. The Quartet retained its influence from 1918 until 1937 or so. Hitler originally wanted to overthrow the Quartet, which he believed was opposed to him on personal grounds and National Socialism on philosophic ones. The members of the Quartet did regard Hitler as an Austrian upstart who was unfit to rule Germany. As late as 1932 and 1933, Field Marshal von Hindenburg still called Hitler "that Bohemian corporal."

In February 1924, the Weimar Republic tried Hitler for his part in the failed Munich putsch of November 8, 1923. He was sentenced to a prison term of five years in the Landsberg Fortress, but only served eight and one-half months. Regarded by his jailers as several levels above the common criminals or leftist political prisoners they usually guarded, Hitler was treated leniently. During this period, he reexamined the tactics of National Socialism. Hitler never changed his basic ideas or goals. They follow a straight line from pre-World War I Vienna to his "Political Testament" of April 1945. He did change his political tactics after 1925, however, and this change allowed him to be successful within eight years. Instead of appearing as a violent revolutionary, Hitler resolved to play the political game by the rules. He would defer outwardly to the Quartet and the traditional rulers of Germany, even though he despised them. He would win over the Quartet and the moderate rightists among the bourgeoisie by posing as a defender of the status quo. People who opposed Hitler the revolutionary would support Hitler the defender of law and order. Above all, Hitler would work to gain support for his National Socialist movement. He would offer concrete advantages to specific, organized constituencies. He also would offer mass mobilization to people who were apolitical or unimpressed by existing political groups.

Hitler understood that politics had a psychological dimension that undermined political theories based on rational interest. To Hitler, people were moved to support a given political party by irrational impulses that were rationalized and moralized after the fact. He felt that an effective political movement allowed people to satisfy deep emotional needs like self-esteem, superiority, and the longing to be part of a greater whole. Political movements, he felt, should give people an outlet for anger, frustration, and violence. Socialism did this, particularly in its communist element, but bourgeois parties overemphasized benign programs and playing by the rules. Democratic socialist parties had come to stress international unity and pacifism. Despite this, socialists had proved nationalistic and eager for war in 1914. In acting against their expressed ideology, the socialists had affirmed the instinctive and competitive basis of political movements. Therefore, a political movement that was based on satisfying deep emotional needs was always stronger than a political movement based on appealing to purely rational interests. This behaviorist assumption shaped Hitler's post-Landsberg career, and he used it to attack and win over the followers of the SPD and bourgeois parties. Hitler was largely successful, especially between 1933 and 1937.

Hitler's view of politics was irrational and predatory. He assumed that the German Communist party (KPD) was successful because its leaders did not hesitate to use political violence. He equated communism with organized destructiveness. He argued that this destructiveness was the product of the real force behind communism—the Jews. To those who argued that many Marxists were not Jews, Hitler answered that Marxism also appealed to non-Jews who sought to destroy Western civilization. These people were motivated by hatred and fear. Hitler believed that the ability to harness these emotions was what made communism successful.

Hitler expressed his political philosophy and his ideas on political mobilization in his book, Mein Kampf (My Struggle). He originally wanted to call his book Five-and-a-Half-Years of Struggle Against Allies, Stupidity and Cowardice, but Max Amann convinced Hitler that a shorter title was necessary. Mein Kampf is a strange and difficult book. While he was at Landsberg, Hitler dictated the book to his visitors, chiefly Rudolf Hess and Amann, Hitler's old sergeant and publisher. Mein Kampf was a transcription of Hitler's conversations; in effect, it was an extended speech.